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The Role of Vaccination, Antiorthopoxvirus Drug,
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Peter Finin, Akhila Kosaraju, Eric Rose, and Harvey Rubin
Considerable effort has gone into making mathematical and computer models of smallpox spread and control measures,
typically consisting of vaccination and quarantine. The orally available antiorthopoxvirus drug tecovirimat has recently
completed Phase 2 clinical trials and shows promise as a smallpox control agent. We constructed 2 computer simulations
to explore the use of tecovirimat in combination with vaccination and social cooperativity to control an outbreak. Two
scenarios were considered: (1) a homogenously mixed, deterministic simulation of a single metropolitan area; and (2) a
stochastic network of the 50 largest US metropolitan areas connected by commercial air traffic. Metropolitan-level mass
vaccination coupled with drug treatment for all individuals who develop a fever considerably outperforms treating only
those who develop smallpox’s distinctive rash. Incorporating mass chemoprophylaxis represents another large im-
provement. More aggressive responses are more robust to low cooperation of the population with public health efforts
and to faster disease spread. However, even with the most aggressive public health intervention, an attack that initially
infects hundreds or thousands of individuals will need to be fought in multiple cities across the country.
Smallpox, the highly infectious, often fatal disease,was eradicated in the 1970s by a well-organized
worldwide campaign of vaccination that was intensely ac-
tive for more than a decade.1 Although the disease is no
longer thought to exist in the wild, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States and
the VECTOR Institute in Russia are known to have stocks
of the disease.2 Concern remains that other stocks may still
exist and that smallpox could be reintroduced to the pop-
ulation, perhaps as a bioterrorist attack.
Many mathematical models and computer simulations
have been constructed to understand the spread of smallpox
and the efficacy of vaccination and quarantine as a response,3-8
but the uses of an effective antiviral drug have not yet been
well explored. The addition of a shelf-stable, orally available9
antiorthopoxvirus drug to the Strategic National Stockpile
suggests reconsideration of control strategies. Obviously, the
nature of the disease prevents generating the necessary clinical
experience that traditionally accompanies recommendations
for antimicrobial use. Under these circumstances, mathe-
matical models become an indispensable analytical tool.
A great deal of excellent work has been done building
computer and mathematical models of smallpox spread and
control.10 Modeling techniques have included homo-
genously mixed populations,3 metapopulation models,5,8
and individual-based models,4,7 simulated either deter-
ministically3 or in some way stochastically.4,5,7,8 All models
are by necessity an abstract representation of reality and
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hence fail to perfectly capture all the details of the real
world. Tradeoffs in modeling decisions abound. Adding
complexity to a model may make it more realistic in some
ways but also increases the number of parameters for which
reliable values may be difficult or impossible to find. Many
authors choose a model such that individuals move through
each of several disease states with exponentially distributed
waiting times,3,5,6,8 allowing the population of each state to
be simply lumped together, but at the cost of allowing a
fraction of individuals to move through their disease course
at speeds arbitrarily faster or slower than has been observed
in real life. Other models move individuals through disease
stages on other timetables,4,7 gaining some realism at the
cost of extra computational complexity. Time may be
continuous, typically with an implicit assumption that the
24 hours of the day feature the same activities and risks of
transmission, or happen in discrete steps.
The scenarios and interventions of interest also suggest
certain modeling choices. It is easier to explore ring vaccination
with a metapopulation model, and contact tracing with an
individual-based model, while mass responses can be captured
in almost any type of model. A stochastic model can capture
the importance of randomness when the number of infected
people, and hence the number of new infection events, is small.
A deterministic model is likely to be less computationally in-
tensive and more tractable to formal mathematical analysis but
less accurately describes small outbreaks.
Modeling choices may bias results in a particular direc-
tion. Homogenous mixing has been said to exaggerate the
rate of spread because it does not capture local saturation,
and thus to favor mass vaccination over contact tracing and
isolation.11 Many models5,6,8 spread the infectivity of in-
dividuals with a rash over the full length of the 8- to 9-day
rash period, whereas infectivity appears to be heavily front-
loaded toward the first 3 days of the rash.12 This makes
isolation appear more effective, as there is a longer window
in which it is worthwhile to find and isolate an individual,
and a lower marginal cost in each day’s delay in doing so.
Few models explicitly consider limited manpower and
other resources needed to carry out contact tracing3 or iso-
lation, a labor- and resource-intensive task that must be
carried out quickly to be effective. Inclusion of this consid-
eration suggests that, while an outbreak started by a small
initial number of infected individuals is controllable through
contact tracing, the ‘‘race to trace’’ contacts of infected cases
will be lost if there is a large number of initial infections.
Most authors have concluded that some sort of ring
vaccination or regional mass vaccination is superior to
contact tracing and isolation under at least some sets of
plausible conditions and parameters.3-5,8 The most notable
exception to this7 relies on a low prodromal infectivity13
that has since been estimated at a considerably higher value
by the same author,12 a high rate of vaccine-related deaths14
that appears to not be greater than would be expected in
nonvaccinated age-matched controls,15 and to also consider
only small initial numbers of infected people.
We were interested in developing a model to explore a large
deliberate release of smallpox and how an effective antiviral
drug could be used in combating it. Many other authors have
found that a large number of infected people puts contact
tracing at a disadvantage compared to mass responses,3-5,8 and
the CDC recommends broad vaccination in such cases.16 Our
interest in large outbreaks and mass responses allowed us to
choose a relatively simple deterministic, homogenously mixed
model. We wanted to capture long-distance geographic
spread, which is likely to be driven by rare events even for an
epidemic numbering in the thousands.17,18 This motivated a
stochastic model for disease spread.
Model
Our model calculates the fraction of the population in each
state on a daily basis. States consist of all combinations of
immune status, vaccination status, drug status, infection
status, and, for those infected, the expected outcome of
their disease (recovery or death). We use separate states for
each day in the infection sequence. Each day, the infected
population moves through its disease progression (sum-
marized in Figure 1), new infections are spawned by the
infectious population, and the public health intervention
takes effect. We first modeled a single metropolitan area of
population 10 million using the parameters (see Table 1)
and dynamics described in the following sections. See the
supplemental information for a more detailed discussion of
the model (www.liebertonline.com/bsp).
We subsequently expanded the model to a multicity
network consisting of the 50 largest Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) in the United States, taken from the 2010
census.17 The total population of these MSAs was approxi-
mately 166 million. We calculated the average number of
commercial air passengers traveling between each pair of
MSAs using the Q1 2010 Airline Origin and Destination
Survey from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.18 The
low rate of air traffic (about 3 people per thousand fly out of
New York to another major metropolitan area daily) means
that even with a large infected population, the number of
infected individuals flying between pairs of cities is small
enough for there to be strong stochastic effects. We thus
modeled intercity spread in a stochastic fashion.
Each day, each city in the network is simulated, and then
travel by infected individuals is calculated. Individuals with
a rash are never able to fly. Individuals with a fever are able
to fly only if their departure city has not yet detected an
outbreak. (See the supplemental material for a more de-
tailed discussion of this calculation.)
The multicity model captures only domestic commercial
air travel. For close pairs of cities that are well connected by
roads or rail (eg, Philadelphia and New York), this sub-
stantially underestimates the total number of passengers
moving between the cities and thus provides a lower bound
on the spread of the disease from one metropolitan area to
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another. Air travel serves only to transport infected indi-
viduals from one city to another in this model; the possi-
bility of the infection spreading on an airplane itself is not
explicitly considered. The model assumes that air traffic is
not substantially altered because of the disease.
Disease Course and Spread Dynamics
Parameters for smallpox’s spread and its interaction with
vaccination are drawn from work by several au-
thors.1,12,13,19,20 In our model, smallpox has an asymp-
tomatic incubation period of length uniformly distributed
from 8 to 17 days12 (which we subdivide into a 7-day ‘‘early
incubation’’ period followed by a ‘‘late incubation’’ period
of 1 to 10 days), followed by a slightly infectious febrile
prodrome period of 3 days,19 followed by a highly infec-
tious early rash period of 3 days,19 followed by a minimally
infectious late rash period of 7 days. The single most
important parameter for determining the severity of an
outbreak and its susceptibility to containment is the basic
reproductive number R0, the number of secondary cases a
single infected individual will cause in a fully susceptible
population. Estimates for R0 vary widely. We consider
values of 3.0,3 6.9,13 and 10.21 The fraction of secondary
cases generated in the prodromal period is taken to be 0.21;
the remainder are caused in the early rash phase.12 Within
each infectious 3-day period, infectivity is taken to be a
constant. At the end of the rash period, infected individuals
die with probability 0.3 and recover with probability 0.7.1
Recovered individuals enjoy long-lasting immunity.
Immunocompromised Individuals
People living with HIV/AIDS, cancer chemotherapy pa-
tients, and solid organ transplant recipients all have reduced
immune function and might be expected to be particularly
vulnerable to smallpox. Kemper estimates the current num-
ber of immunocompromised individuals as 3.6% of the US
Figure 1. Disease ProgressionOverview. Infected peoplemove through the shown stages as their disease progresses. Blue arrows indicate
the natural progression of the disease. The prodromal and early rash stages shown in red are both infectious. The violet arrow indicates the
possibility of vaccination or drug treatment of early incubators to preempt the disease, removing them from the disease progression. The
amount of time spent in the late incubation stage is uniformly distributed from 1 to 10 days; all other stages last for a fixed length of time.
Table 1. Disease Parameters
Parameter Description Value
R0 Basic reproductive number 3,
3 6.9,13 10.019
f Fraction of transmissions during prodrome 0.2112
t incubation Asymptomatic incubation time 8-17 days
t prodrome Febrile prodrome duration 3 days20
t early rash Highly infectious early rash duration 3 days20
M Mortality 0.31
t vaccinate Time to vaccinate population 10,3 21 days
t chemoprophylaxis Time to distribute chemoprophylaxis to population 2,21 4 days
C Population cooperativity 1.0, 0.9, 0.8
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population.22 These groups were all much smaller or non-
existent when smallpox was still endemic, so their exact sus-
ceptibility can only be approximated. Amorosa and Isaacs
suggest that immunocompromised individuals are likely to be
more susceptible to smallpox and are more likely to develop
the difficult-to-diagnose, highly infectious, and particularly
deadly confluent, flat, and hemorrhagic presentations of the
disease.23 Immunocompromised individuals are normally
contraindicated for receiving the regular smallpox vaccine,
although the Modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA) vaccine24 is
considered safe for them.25We model immunocompromised
individuals as twice as susceptible, twice as infectious, and
twice as likely to die if infected.
Vaccination Dynamics
Successful recent vaccination provides almost complete pro-
tection against contracting smallpox. Prompt postexposure
vaccination can preempt the course of the disease or attenuate
its severity. We use Massoudi’s26 estimates of postexposure
vaccine effectiveness: vaccination within 1 day postexposure
provides a 90% chance of preventing disease and, failing that,
a 90% chance of preventing mortality; vaccination within 3
days postexposure provides an 80% chance of disease pre-
vention and 80% mortality prevention; and vaccination
within 7 days postexposure provides a 25% chance of disease
prevention and 50% mortality prevention. These values are
summarized in Table 2. Our model assumes a 95% take rate
for vaccination.14,27 Those vaccinations that take provide
complete protection; those that do not take provide none.
Protection due to vaccination in the distant past is con-
siderably attenuated. In pre-eradication times, smallpox
outbreaks often claimed the lives of large numbers of indi-
vidualswhohadbeenvaccinated 10ormore years previously.1
We assume that routine vaccinations carried out before 1972
offer no residual protection and that the fraction of the
population that has been recently vaccinated is negligible.
Drug Dynamics
Tecovirimat’s efficacy against different orthopoxviruses has
been explored in a variety of animal models. Experiments
have shown that it can rescue animals from lethal pox
disease after the onset of symptoms.28-30 The drug can
rescue some, but not all, immunocompromised mice from
lethal pox disease.31 The drug can be offered in conjunction
with vaccination, and animals enjoy the benefit of both
treatments.32 Infected animals receiving tecovirimat treat-
ment have greatly reduced viral shedding in their nasal
passages and lungs, suggesting reduced infectivity.33
Based on the animal experiments, our model assumes
that prophylactic drug treatment provides protection from
infection, treatment within 7 days of infection prevents
disease, treatment before the onset of rash offers 99%
protection from mortality, and treatment within the first 3
days of rash offers 80% protection of mortality. We further
assume that infectious individuals who are receiving drug
treatment are 0.25 times as infectious as untreated indi-
viduals, effective the day after the start of treatment.
Attack Size
Each simulation begins with a certain number of initially in-
fectedpeople,whichwe term the attack size.Weconsider attack
Table 2. Postexposure and Treatment Parameters
Treatment Time
Probability of
Preempting Disease
Probability of
Preventing Mortality
Vaccination £ 1 day postinfection 0.9022 0.9022
Vaccination £ 3 days postinfection 0.8022 0.8022
Vaccination £ 7 days postinfection 0.2522 0.5022
Drug £ 7 days postinfection 1.0 NA
Drug Before onset of rash 0 0.99
Drug £ 3 days post onset of rash 0 0.80
Table 3. Interventions
Number Description
1 ‘‘Full vaccination’’ of the entire population,
assuming that use of the MVA vaccine
means no one is contraindicated
2 Full vaccination, plus drug treatment of
individuals after their first day of rash
3 Full vaccination, plus treatment of individuals
after their first day of fever
4 Full vaccination, plus mass chemoprophylaxis
5 Full vaccination, mass chemoprophylaxis, and
drug treatment after the first day of rash for
those individuals either noncooperative with
chemoprophylaxis or still waiting for
chemoprophylaxis delivery
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sizes ranging from 1 to 100,000 by powers of 10. An attack size
of 1 or 10 could represent an accidental release. Larger attacks
would represent a well-executed bioterrorism attack.
Responses
Our model assumes that a smallpox outbreak is detected
when 10 individuals have developed a rash. There is then a
3-day confirmation and preparation period, after which
the public health intervention begins. We considered the
following interventions: (1) mass vaccination of the entire
metropolitan area, assuming that use of the MVA vaccine
means no one is contraindicated; (2) mass vaccination plus
drug treatment of individuals after their first day of rash;
(3) mass vaccination plus treatment of individuals after
their first day of fever; (4) mass vaccination plus mass
chemoprophylaxis; and (5) mass vaccination, mass che-
moprophylaxis, and drug treatment of individuals after
their first day of rash (Table 3). When individuals begin
chemoprophylaxis, they are assumed to continue for the
duration of the model. Symptomatic individuals who
begin treatment and recover are assumed to enjoy long-
lasting immunity.
When simulating the multicity model, after the outbreak
is detected in one city, other cities will detect an outbreak as
soon as a single individual develops a rash.
Figure 2. Selected Results of Single-City Simulation with Attack Size of 1,000 People. Results for interventions 1 through 5 are
shown. Optimistic parameters consist of R0 = 3.0, cooperativity = 1.0, vaccination time = 10 days, chemoprophylaxis time = 2 days.
Medium parameters consist of R0 = 6.9, cooperativity = 0.9, vaccination time = 21 days, chemoprophylaxis time = 4 days. Pessimistic
parameters consist of R0= 10.0, cooperativity = 0.8, vaccination time = 21 days, chemoprophylaxis time = 4 days. Figure 2(A) shows the
number of days required for the intervention to eliminate the disease; interventions that do not control the spread of the disease are
shown as infinite. Figure 2(B) shows morbidity and mortality as fractions of the populations. Morbidity is shown in light colors;
mortality is shown in dark colors. The dotted horizontal line indicates the initial attack size.
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Kaplan et al estimate that a mass vaccination campaign
could be carried out in 10 days.3 The 1947 vaccination
campaign in New York, which did not screen vaccinees,
peaked at a rate of 500,000 per day.34 Given a population
of 7.9 million,35 this suggests a timetable of no less than
15 days. We consider vaccination timetables of 10 and
21 days.
The CDC’s Cities Readiness Initiative sets as a goal that
cities should be able to distribute antibiotics to their entire
population within 48 hours.36 It is uncertain how many
Figure 3. Sensitivity Analysis for Cooperativity and R0 in Single-City Model. For (A), (C), and (E), cooperativity is allowed to vary
from 0.10 to 1.0, while R0 = 6.9.
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Figure 3. For (B), (D), and (F), R0 is allowed to vary from 3.0 to 10.0, while cooperativity = 0.90. Vaccination time = 10 days,
chemoprophylaxis time = 2 days, and attack size = 1,000 for all graphs. Figures (A) and (B) show the number of days required to
eliminate the disease; interventions that do not control the spread of the disease are shown as infinite. Figures (C) and (D) show the
morbidity, and Figures (E) and (F) show the mortality.
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Figure 4. Sensitivity Analysis for Drug Effectiveness Parameters.
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cities are prepared to meet this goal. Our model considers
mass chemoprophylaxis distribution timetables of 2 and
4 days.
Cooperativity
Public health measures may miss some individuals because
of logistical failures, and some individuals may opt out of
participation because of various beliefs or preferences. Our
model consolidates these factors into a single ‘‘co-
operativity’’ parameter. The fraction of individuals who will
be vaccinated is equal to the cooperativity. Under mass
chemoprophylaxis interventions, the fraction of individuals
who will receive the chemoprophylaxis is equal to the co-
operativity. Under fever- or rash-based treatment inter-
ventions, the fraction of people eligible to begin treatment
who do so each day is equal to the cooperativity. Individuals
decide to cooperate with vaccination and drug treatment
independently. For low cooperativity scenarios, while many
healthy people may skip prophylactic measures entirely,
symptomatic sick people will often delay but seldom
completely skip treatment.
A recent meta-analysis of 37 studies on the factors that
determine an individual’s intention to receive the H1N1
Figure 4. Sensitivity Analysis for Drug Effectiveness Parameters. For Figures (A), (B), and (C), the infectivity multiplier for
individuals treated with the drug is varied from 0.1 to 0.75. For Figure (D), the protection from mortality for individuals beginning drug
treatment before development of a rash is varied from 0.5 to 0.99. For Figure (E), the protection from mortality for individuals beginning
drug treatment during the first 3 days of rash is varied from 0.5 to 0.9. R0= 6.9, cooperativity= 0.9, vaccination time= 10 days,
chemoprophylaxis time= 2 days, and attack size= 1,000 for all graphs. Figure (A) shows the number of days required to eliminate the
disease; interventions that do not control the spread of the disease are shown as infinite. Figure (B) shows the morbidity, and Figures (C),
(D), and (E) show the mortality. Changing mortality protection parameters has no impact on elimination time or morbidity.
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vaccine, or actual vaccination, showed a range of co-
operativity that depended on beliefs in vulnerability to
H1N1 infection, concerns over safety and efficacy of the
vaccine, previous experience with vaccinations, and sources
of information about the disease and the vaccine. Intention
to receive the vaccine ranged between 5% in Hong Kong if
cost and safety were considered, to 11% in one study in the
general population in France, to 80% in the general pop-
ulation in Mexico. Vaccination rates were lower, ranging
from 13% in one study of healthcare workers in Turkey to
51% in workers in a cancer hospital in France, to 76% in
pregnant women in Canada.37 Studies with mothers who
make choices for their daughters to receive the HPV vaccine
are in the same range, with one group reporting ‘‘probably
yes, 48%; definitely yes, 27%; unsure, 19%; and probably
or definitely not, 6%.’’38 We do detailed analyses with
cooperativities of 1.0, 0.9, and 0.8 in combination with
other varied parameters. In our sensitivity analysis, we also
smoothly vary cooperativity from 0.1 to 1.0, with a fixed
R0 = 6.9, 10-day mass vaccination timetable, and 2-day
mass chemoprophylaxis timetable, in order to explore in
greater detail the relationship between cooperation and
outcomes.
Results
Single-City Model
Figure 2 shows the results of selected simulations of the
single-city model. As expected, more aggressive interven-
tions contain the outbreak faster and with fewer infections
and deaths. Beginning drug treatment at the rash stage
provides strong protection from mortality to infected in-
dividuals, but generally has a small effect on the duration or
magnitude of the outbreak. Treating all individuals who
develop a fever substantially outperforms treating after the
appearance of a rash, eliminating the outbreak faster and
with substantially lower morbidity and mortality. Both
mass chemoprophylaxis interventions shown contain the
outbreak under all tested parameters and do so faster and
with a lower morbidity than any other intervention.
Full vaccination plus mass chemoprophylaxis (interven-
tion 4) has surprisingly high mortality, higher than under
full vaccination plus rash treatment (intervention 2). Sev-
eral factors contribute to this. When cooperativity is less
than 1.0, some individuals will neither be vaccinated nor
receive chemoprophylaxis. Some of them will become in-
fected. Under intervention 4, they do not receive any
treatment. Additionally, intervention 4 does not prioritize
infected individuals for chemoprophylaxis. Individuals who
are infected when the outbreak is detected may have to wait
as long as 4 days to receive their drugs, during which time
they may progress to a less treatable state. Intervention 5,
which incorporates treatment for individuals with a rash,
greatly ameliorates both of these problems.
Even under the most pessimistic parameters we con-
sider, for attack sizes of at least 100, intervention 5 elimi-
nates the outbreak with morbidity less than 4 times the
initial attack size, and mortality less than a quarter of the
original attack size.
Figure 3 shows sensitivity analysis of cooperativity
and R0, while Figure 4 shows sensitivity analysis of drug
effectiveness parameters. Figures 3 (A), (C), and (E) vary
cooperativity, while Figures 3(B), (D), and (F) vary R0.
All other parameters are held constant. With a high co-
operativity or low R0, all interventions will eliminate the
outbreak in less than a year, with fewer than 8 people ul-
timately infected per initial infection and with more ag-
gressive responses performing better than less aggressive
ones. With progressively more adverse parameters, the
performance of each intervention decays gradually at first,
with most of those nonprotected individuals still benefiting
from a degree of herd immunity. With sufficiently difficult
parameters, each intervention eventually ceases to be able to
contain the outbreak, resulting in most nonprotected in-
dividuals contracting the disease. More aggressive inter-
ventions are more robust to low cooperativity and high R0;
for example, intervention 1 fails to contain the outbreak
when cooperativity drops below 93%, while intervention 2
fails below 90%, 3 below 72%, 4 below 67%, and 5 below
64%, all using an R0 of 6.9.
Figures 4(A), (B), and (C) vary the infectivity multiplier
that captures the reduced viral shedding of individuals
treated with the drug, while Figures 4(D) and (E) vary the
reduction in mortality for infected individuals who begin
drug treatment. Changing the infectivity multiplier has its
largest effect on interventions 2 and 3, only a small effect on
interventions 4 and 5, and, unsurprisingly, no effect on
intervention 1. Changing the mortality reduction parame-
ters has no effect on elimination time or morbidity.
Changing the mortality reduction parameter for pre-rash
treatment primarily affects intervention 3, with total mor-
tality varying by about a factor of 20 between a protection
of 50% and 99%. Interventions 4 and 5 are weakly sensitive
to this change, and interventions 1 and 2 not at all.
Changing the mortality reduction parameter for post-rash
treatment unsurprisingly affects intervention 2 most
strongly, with smaller effects on interventions 3 through 5.
We also set our parameters to mirror as closely as
possible Kaplan and colleagues’ model.39 Changing our
parameters cannot perfectly mimic Kaplan’s exponentially
distributed waiting times, which allow arbitrarily fast and
slow disease progression. However, our model’s results are
in general agreement with Kaplan’s. Figure 5 shows these
results.
Multicity Model
An initial attack on 1 or 10 people will likely not spread to
another city before it can be detected. An attack on 100
people will likely spread to several other cities, and larger
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attacks will almost certainly be widely spread by the time
the first rashes develop. Figure 6 summarizes these data.
Figure 7 shows the results of selected simulations of the
multicity network. All numbers are the average of 7 inde-
pendent runs. The standard deviations of this data are
shown for number of cities infected and control time.
Standard deviations of morbidity and mortality are too
small to be shown on a log scale graph. The results are
broadly similar to those of the single-city model. Initiating
treatment at the fever stage substantially outperforms
waiting until the rash stage. Particularly for medium and
pessimistic parameter sets, interventions including mass
chemoprophylaxis are able to control the outbreak sub-
stantially faster and with far fewer infections.
Discussion
We constructed a computer model of smallpox spread and
mass responses for both a single metropolitan area and a
network of metropolitan areas linked by commercial air
traffic. The availability of an effective, easily distributable
antiorthopoxvirus drug substantially improves the ability of
public health measures to control a smallpox outbreak.
Treating individuals as soon as they develop a fever is much
more effective than waiting until they develop smallpox’s
distinctive rash. Incorporating mass chemoprophylaxis into
the response represents an additional large improvement,
enabling the control of the outbreak under even worst-case
conditions. Because tecovirimat treatment appears to re-
duce viral shedding substantially, treatment of infectious
individuals before their infectious peak is especially effective
at reducing the spread of the disease and allowing it to come
under control.
If smallpox control plans are expected to be able to re-
spond to a bioterrorist attack on the scale of hundreds or
thousands of initially infected people, authorities should
plan for the simultaneous development of outbreaks in
multiple cities.
The sensitivity of key outcomes to parameters is very
important. Near the boundary between an effective and
ineffective intervention, outcomes can be extremely sensi-
tive to cooperativity: A single percentage difference in
cooperativity can correspond to more than a tenfold dif-
ference in morbidity under interventions 1 and 2 (see
supplemental data). The locations of the boundaries de-
pend on the values of other parameters and the intervention
in question. For R0 = 6.9, morbidity under intervention 1
features the highest sensitivity to cooperativity when
coop = 0.92, under intervention 2 at a value of 0.89, and for
interventions 3 through 5 below 0.70. Conversely, for a
cooperativity of 0.90, morbidity under intervention 1 fea-
tures the highest sensitivity to R0 when R0 = 6.0, under
intervention 2 at a value of 7.2, and under interventions 3
through 5 above 10. In the face of considerable uncertainty
regarding the basic reproductive number that could be
expected of smallpox and the cooperativity that could be
achieved in the public health response, it is highly attractive
Figure 6. The Number of Cities Containing at Least 1 of the
Inital Cohort of Infected Individuals at the Time when the First
Rash Develops, as a Function of Attack Size. Figures shown are
the average and standard deviation of 100 independent stochastic
simulations.
Figure 5. Results of Simulations Carried Out with Parameters Designed to Approximate Kaplan’s Model. The incubation time is 4
to 18 days. All infections are spawned during the 3-day prodromal period, followed by 7 days of quarantined, and thus noninfectious,
rash. The full population is immunocompetent. R0 is 3, vaccine is 100% effective, and cooperativity is 1. Figure 5(A) shows the time
course of the total number of infected people following a 1,000-person attack on a 10,000,000-person metropolitan area. Mass
vaccination begins on day 0, defined to be the day of the first appearance of a rash. Figure 5(B) shows the dependence of mortality on
R0 under this scenario. These graphs are generally similar to Figures 7(a) and 7(b) in Kaplan’s 2003 paper.
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Figure 7. Selected Results of Multicity Simulation with Attack Size of 1,000 People in New York City. Results for interventions 1
through 5 are shown. Reported numbers are the average of 7 independent stochastic simulations. Error bars indicate the standard
deviation of these values. Where error bars are not drawn, standard deviations are too small to show on this scale. Parameter sets are the
same as in Figure 2. Figure 7(A) shows the number of days required for the intervention to eliminate the disease; interventions that do not
control the spread of the disease are shown as infinite; interventions that have not eliminated the disease by the end of the simulation are
reported as 1,095. Figure 7(B) shows morbidity and mortality as fractions of the populations. Morbidity is shown in light colors; mortality
is shown in dark colors. The dotted horizontal line indicates the initial attack size. Figure 7(C) shows the number of cities that have been
infected by day 1,095. The dotted line indicates the expected number of cities to already be infected when the first case of rash develops.
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to have interventions that are not keenly sensitive to these
parameters within reasonable expected ranges of values.
At the same time, the sometimes sharp dependence of
outcomes on the cooperativity parameter emphasizes the
need for the public to understand and comply with re-
sponse plans. This was a clear lesson learned from the re-
sponse of the public to the recent pandemic novel
H1N1,40-42 during which the public was often slow and
reluctant to follow public health advice.
Further modeling work would help to better prepare for
an attack. In the simulations described here, the outbreak is
detected only when symptomatic cases begin to develop. A
bioterrorist attack might be detected by law enforcement at
the time of the attack, allowing for a substantially earlier
response. Models should explore the effect of these early
responses. For early detections or low attack sizes, targeted
or traced responses may compare favorably to the mass
responses described here. Models exploring these scenarios
should also be built.
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